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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 54 MARCH 1956 No. 5 
PATENT OFFICE PERFORMANCE IN PERSPECTIVE* 
George E. Frostt 
" the only patent that is valid is one which this 
Court has not been able to get its hands on."1 
JUSTICE Jackson's note of despair reflects all too accurately the treatment patents have seemingly received in the hands of the 
courts since the "new trend" of recent years.2 It has become 
the legal fashion to characterize letters patent as something the 
Patent Office issues and the courts strike down. Statistical support 
for this conclusion can be readily assembled.8 
• The author acknowledges the help of Mr. John Verhoeven of the Illinois bar in 
the preparation of this article. 
t B.S. 1940, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D. 1945, George Washington Univer-
sity; member, District of Columbia and Illinois bars; Director~ Patent Law Program, 
John Marshall Law School; Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago; member, Attorney 
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.-Ed. 
l Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 at 572, 69 S.Ct. 269 (1949) (dissenting 
opinion). 
2 See, e.g., Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 636; 
Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Direkes, (6th Cir. 1943) 136 F.(2d) 24 at 27. But cf. 
Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., (7th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 427 at 428. 
s E.g., Lang and Thomas, "Disposition of Patent Cases by Courts During the Period 
1939 to 1949," 32 J.P.O.S. 802 (1950); Walter, "A Ten Year Survey of Design Patent 
Litigation," 35 J.P.O.S. 389 (1953); Davis, "The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Cases 
on the Question of Patentable Invention," 44 !LI.. L. REv. 41 (1949). At page 47, Davis 
comments on the statistics respecting the patent cases to conclude, "This is a sharp drop, 
greatly more than could reasonably be explained by any difference in methods of 
compilation or in deciding question of infringement. It must be partly, if not largely, 
due to the more critical application of the tests of invention, in other words, a higher 
standard of invention." 
A particularly significant recent statistical study is found at pages 176 to 185 and 
287 to 293 of the Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks 
and Copyrights, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), pursuant to S. Res. 92, entitled American 
Patent System. This study was prepared by Mr. P. J. Federico of the Patent Office. 
It includes data covering all available district court and court of appeals decisions on 
patents in the seven-year period from 1948 to 1954. Federico reports that 53% of the 
patents before the district courts were held invalid and 63% of the patents before the 
courts of appeals. He also includes long term tables indicating that in the 1925-1954 
period the percentage of patents held invalid by the courts of appeals increased from 
about 33% in the 1925-1929 period to a peak of about 64% in the 1945-1949 period. His 
data for the Supreme Court covering the 1925-1954 era are surprisingly indecisive in 
terms of trend. 
The Federico study also covered 50 recent cases where patents were held invalid by 
courts of appeals. Consistently with the views expressed herein, he found comparatively 
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Some judicial expressions have taken a more ominous turn. 
With marked impatience some members of the judiciary have . 
pointed to the Patent Office as failing to hold fast to the standards 
it is charged with applying. Thus we have Justice Douglas de-
claring: 
"The patent involved in the present case belongs to this. 
list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has spawned. 
The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has 
to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid 
dramatically illustrates how far our present patent system de-
parts from the constitutional standards which are supposed to 
govern."4 
And in a more recent case, where a jury had held the patent valid 
and infringed, Judge Hastie protests: 
"This patent of the obviously unpatentable and indica-
tions that the category of patented unpatentables is a large 
one, cause us to express a final word of regret that the Patent 
Office in analyzing and disposing of patent applications does 
not more consistently use that expertise with which courts 
credit it along with .other specialized administrative agen-
cies."5 
With this apparent unanimity of contrary expression one must 
be bold indeed to question the proposition that the courts are 
in fact following a stricter standard of invention than the Patent 
Office. 6 Yet such doubt finds considerable support in the cases 
and raises the question of how far impatience with individual 
factual situations has led to general conclusions contrary to the 
overall facts. Consideration of this question at the present time 
is especially timely in view of current judicial divergencies re-
few cases holding patents invalid on the art before the Patent Office (six out of the 40 
patents. in the group held invalid on prior art). He also reports that the cases of actual 
"anticipation"-where the prior art is exactly what the patent claim states-were "very 
few." And of the ten most recent Supreme Court decisions holding patents invalid 
Federico's data indicate that where prior art has been decisive it has generally been art 
not considered by the patent examiner. 
The Federico study did not attempt to determine the .extent expansive patent 
constructions have influenced holdings of patent invalidity. 
4 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 at 158, 71 
S.Ct. 127 (1950) (concurring opinion). 
6 Packwood v. Briggs and Stratton Corp., (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 971 at 974. 
Compare Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (6th Cir. 1941) 121 F. 
(2d) 273 at 277, affd. 316 U.S. 364, 62 S.Ct. 1179 (1942). 
6 It should be noted that some commentators have found in the decisions a trend 
toward earlier and stricter views on patentability. See, e.g., Smith, "Recent Developments 
in Patent Law," 44 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1946). 
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specting the statutory definition now expressed in section 103 .of 
the Patent Code.7 This consideration-coupled with observations 
on the so-called "file wrapper estoppel" doctrine-also sheds some 
light on the most promising directions for improvements in Patent 
Office procedure. 
The heart of the problem lies in making a meaningful com-
parison between court determinations on the issue of invention, 
on the one hand, and the Patent Office determinations, on the 
other. To be sure, both are directed to resolution of the same 
statutory question-and in both the test is whether ". . . the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains."8 
But when the circumstances of the respective determinations are 
considered, important differences become apparent. 
Perhaps the most significant factual showing usually available 
in court proceedings and not generally available before the Patent 
Office is evidence respecting the commercial impact of the inven-
tion. Extreme cases aside, it is virtually impossible to make an 
abstract determination of whether a particular change is or is not 
within the "skill of the art" -for the level of such skill is itself 
highly indefinite. As Judge Learned Hand has stated, " ... 
[invention] is as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a 
7 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. A number of courts have concluded that the code makes no 
change in the standard of invention. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 
(6th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 912, cert. den. 346 U.S. 822, 74 S.Ct. 37 (1953); New Wrinkle 
v. Watson, (D. C. Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 35, cert. den. 346 U.S. 820, 74 S.Ct. 35 (1953). 
On the other hand Judge Learned Hand has recently found in §103 a restoration of the 
more liberal patent decisions of a generation ago. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 
(2d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 530 at 535, cert. den. 350 U.S. 911, 76, S.Ct. 193 (1955). Cf. 
Pacific Contact Labs. v. Solex Labs., (9th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 529 at 533, cert. den. 
348 U.S. 816, 75 S.Ct. 26 (1954). 
s 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. This test is an approximation of the "skill of the art" test 
first applied by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, lI How. (52 U.S.) 248 
(1850). There (at 265) the Court affirmed a jury charge that if "no more ingenuity or 
skill [was] required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary 
mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid .... " In the report on 
the bill that became the patent code it is stated with respect to §103: "This paragraph 
is added with the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stablizing 
effect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which 
may be worked out." H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 18 (1952), to accompany 
H.R. 7794 And in the general comments on the code the report states that §103 "should 
have some stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some 
cases." Id., p. 7. See Federico, "Commentary on the New Patent Act," 35 U.S.C.A. pp. 
19-23 (1954); Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act 
of 1952," 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1955). 
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phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts."9 
To resolve the indecisive situations, the courts have looked to the 
commercial history of the invention-usually fully developed by 
the time the infringement suit must be decided. Commercial 
success of products embodying the invention,10 a long felt want 
satisfied by the invention,11 recognition of the invention by licenses 
taken by the industry, 12 and similar considerations have weighed 
heavily in the judicial decisions.13 Conversely, lack of success in 
the market place has been used to support findings of lack of in-
vention.14 All of these commercial considerations find their 
logical basis in the proposition that the industry itself is the best 
measure of what is normal "skill of the art." 
A second broad area of difference between court and Patent 
Office determinations of invention relates to proof of some seg-
ments of the prior art. The patent law defines certain prior patents, 
publications, uses, knowledge, sales, and other matters which are 
to be considered as part of the "prior art."15 It is with respect to 
the combined effect of all of these that the test of "invention" must 
be made.16 As a matter of practical necessity the Patent Office 
largely confines its attention to those portions of the prior art 
represented by documents.17 In consequence, items such as prior 
knowledge, prior public use, and the like often do not come to 
the attention of the office. Defendants in patent suits are under 
no such disability and can locate and prove these elements of the 
9 Harries v. Air King Products, Inc., (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 158 at 162. 
10 E.g., The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 
593 (1944); Wahl Clipper Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., (7th Cir .. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 162. 
11 E.g., Hunt v. Armour and Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 722: The Goodyear 
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593 (1944). 
12 E.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 43 S.Ct. 
322 (1923). 
13 Thus, in the Ray-O-Vac case, 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593 (1944), the Court empha-
sized the successful practice of ihe patentee of offering to replace a complete flashlight 
upon leakage of the patented battery. 
14 " ... but failure is an almost infallible test of non-invention, and for all practical 
purposes Sarazin's disclosures were failures, and indeed confessed failures." Clark v. 
Wright Aeronautical Corp., (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 960 at 966. And see Bostitch, Inc. 
v. Precision Staple Corp., (2d Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 332 at 336 (lack of problem of long 
duration or unsuccessful efforts to solve the problem noted in finding no invention). 
15 35 u.s.c. (1952) §102. 
16 E.g., Detrola Radio & Television Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 313 U.S. 259, 61 S.Ct. 
948 (1941). 
17 The office does, however, use documents as at least prima facie proofs of the facts 
they state as well as "printed publications." Thus in a line of decisions the office has 
taken published articles as prima facie proof of knowledge of their contents in the 
United States as of the dates the manuscripts are indicated as received by the publisher. 
E.g., Ex parte Ordas, 104 U.S. P.Q. 74 (Board of Appeals, 1954). 
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prior art, in which event a court may strike down as noninventive 
what the Patent Office has found to be invention. In such in-
stances the difficulty is not one of Patent Office judgment but 
rather one of inherent limitations on available proofs. 
Still another substantial area of departure between the courts 
and the Patent Office resides in the interpretation of the patent 
itself. In a surprising number of practical cases the patent owner 
applies an expansive patent interpretation in an effort to reach 
the activity of the alleged infringer. In so doing he may take 
undue license with the patent itself and in any event takes a posi-
tion in court that various differences between the patent and the 
accused structure or process are unimportant details. Similar 
differences between the patent and the prior art are then-by the 
patentee's own test-unimportant. As an early decision points out 
"that which infringes, if later, would anticipate if earlier."18 Here 
again we have an area of inquiry closed to the Patent Office for the 
expansive claim interpretation bringing the prior art into play is 
not made until the infringement problem arises.19 
When the decisions on invention are considered in the light of 
these factors, a surprising pattern emerges. Far from repudiating 
the Patent Office, the courts, in the presence of showings of com-
merical success, have displayed a tendency to find invention in the 
most simple changes. And, even more impressively, a significant 
number of instances can be found where courts sitting in direct 
18 Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221 at 228, 14 S.Ct. 81 (1893). 
19 Smith v. Hall, 301 U.S. 216, 57 S.Ct. 711 (1937), vividly illustrates this effect. There 
the patent had been involved in an earlier case, at which time the patentee successfully 
urged that the claims were of scope to cover egg incubators regardless of the arrange-
ment of the eggs. Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20, 55 S.Ct. 277 (1935). In the Waxham 
case the Court had rejected the argument of the defendant there that the patent claims 
were limited to the use of "staged" incubation wherein the eggs were arranged in stages 
in accordance with their age. In the subsequent Hall case the defendant relied upon a 
public use where the eggs were not arranged in stages but otherwise the process of the 
patent was used. The Court logically insisted that the construction given to .the patent 
in the earlier litigation must hold in the later suit and accordingly found the patent 
invalid for prior public use. 
The reverse took place in Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Graver Tank &: Mfg. 
Co., (7th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 103, cert. den. 343 U.S. 967, 72 S.Ct. 1059 (1952), 344 U.S. 
849, 73 S.Ct. 6 (1952). At an earlier stage in the case the patentee had emphasized the 
argument that the components of the patented welding flux were fully reacted. Linde 
Air Products v. Graver Tank, (7th Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 531 [mod. 336 U.S. 271, 69 
S.Ct. 535 (1949) and 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950)]. In the later proceedings the 
court insisted that the patent be construed in a manner consistent with the earlier 
representations and accordingly found no infringement in the use of a flux with partially, 
as distinguished from fully, reacted components. 
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review of Patent Office refusals to issue patents have overturned 
the Patent Office rulings.20 
Consider the fact situation of the Ray-0-Vac case.21 There the 
"invention" lay in encasing an ordinary flashlight cell in a steel 
jacket. The concept was the utmost of simplicity. If flashlight 
cells expand and jam when exhausted, enclose them in an un-
yielding steel jacket. Of course some degree of ingenuity must 
be exercised-for the jacket must not short circuit the cell itself. 
But this could be and was solved by interposing a cardboard 
sheath underneath the steel jacket, a material which had long 
previously been used in flashlight cells. The result was a non-
jamming construction which went into almost universal use. The 
Supreme Court characterized the patent as "a very narrow one in 
a crowded art."22 
20 E.g., Application of Hudson, (C.C.P .A. 1953) 205 F. (2d) I 74; Application of 
Schechter, (C.C.P .A. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 185; Application of Horvath, (C.C.P .A. 1954) 211 . 
F. (2d) 604; Application of Sutton, (C.C.P.A. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 582; Application of 
Stanley, (C.C.P.A. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 151; Application of Twomey and Schilling, (C.C.P.A. 
1954) 218 F. (2d) 593; Application of Hotchkin, (C.C.P.A. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 490; Applica-
tion of Gartner, (C.C.P .A. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 502; Application of Van Deventer, (C.C.P .A. 
1955) 223 F. (2d) 274; Application of Krodel, (C.C.P.A. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 285; McCashen 
v. Watson, (D.C.D.C. 1955) 131 F. Supp. 233. The patent involved in Helene Curtis 
Industries v. Sales Affiliates, (D.C.N.Y. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 490 (appeal pending), was 
initially rejected by the Patent Office examiner and that rejection was made final. The 
Board of Appeals of the Patent Office affirmed. On bill in equity brought by the appli-
cant the court granted the bill, thus ordering the Commissioner to issue the patent. 
The Patent Office took its own appeal from that decision. While the appeal was pending 
the applicant presented more limited claims which met the approval of the examiner. 
The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the patent issued. The patent was held 
invalid in the subsequent declaratory judgment proceedings brought by alleged infringers. 
The Patent Office took its own appeal in Weeks v. Warp, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d) 
108. There the office had rejected the claims in question as lacking invention and on 
the further ground that the earlier decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
in In re Warp, (C.C.P .A. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 658, and In re Warp, (C.C.P .A. 1946) 154 
F. (2d) 661, were res judicata. After this Patent Office rejection the applicant filed 
bill in equity in the District Court for the District of Columbia, which held that some 
of the claims were allowabJe. The Patent Office thereupon took its appeal from the 
district court judgment, at which time the court of appeals reversed the district court 
to affirm the Patent Office ruling. 
Over a IO-year period the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in ex parte cases 
has affirmed the Patent Office in 79.9% of the appeals and the District Court of the 
United States for the District of Columbia in ex parte cases has affirmed the Patent 
Office in 78.3% of the cases. Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, 
Trademarks and Copyrights, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 174 (1955), pursuant to S. Res. 92, 
entitled American Patent System. . 
The case of Hayes Industries v. Watson, 108 U.S.P.Q. 201 (1955), affords another 
interesting illustration of the Patent Office examining activity. In this case the court 
upheld Patent Office refusal to grant a patent on the same disclosure for which the 
British patent office had granted a patent. 
21 The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Ray-0-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593 
(1944). 
22 Id. at 276. 
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As might be expected, the patent examiner initially rejected 
the patent application to the Ray-O-Vac battery. He repeated the 
rejection after a written argument by the applicant. After an 
interview with the attorney, at which time the matter of com-
mercial success was emphasized, the examiner allowed the patent.23 
Significantly, the Ray-O-Vac policy of guaranteeing replacement 
of the flashlight in the event of battery damage-later emphasized 
in court opinions-was emphasized before the patent examiner. 
In the subsequent patent infringement suit major emphasis 
was placed upon the efforts and failures of the past and upon the 
element of commercial success. The district court found the 
patent valid and infringed.24 Similar arguments prevailed in the 
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit.25 On certiorari, a majority of the Supreme Court-again· 
placing emphasis upon commercial success, coupled with concur-
rent fact findings of invention below-upheld the patent and 
placed the final word of approval upon the action of the Patent 
Office.26 The contention that the patent was directed to nothing 
more than a steel container was rejected by the majority of the 
Court with the observation: "Viewed after the event, the means 
Anthony adopted seem simple and such as should have been 
obvious to those who worked in the field, but this is not enough to 
negative invention."27 
Similiar decisions of an earlier day readily come to mind.28 
For example, in the Eibel Process case29 the Court found invention 
in doing what would, in retrospect, seem most obvious, namely, 
making slurry flow more uniformly onto a moving belt by inclin-
ing the belt slightly downward. The decision is of particular 
interest in its emphasis upon the narrow character of the invention 
as an improvement upon the old and well known Fourdrinier 
paper-making machine and upon the acceptance of the invention 
by the industry. 
23 Patent Office file, patent 2,198,423. This file was not in the record before the 
Supreme Court. 
24 (D.C. Ill. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 927. 
25 (7th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 159. 
26 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593 (1944). 
27 Id. at 279. 
28E.g., The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 at 277, 283, 12 S.Ct. 443 (1892); 
Expanded Metal v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 at 381, 29 S.Ct. 652 (1909); Keystone Mfg. Co. 
v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 14 S.Ct. 295 (1894); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire 
Co., 220 U.S. 428, 31 S.Ct. 444 (1911). For an analysis of some of the leading decisions 
of the past sustaining patents issued over very close prior art, see Dodds and Crotty, 
"The New Doctrinal Trend," 30 J.P.O.S. 83 (1948). 
29 Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 43 S.Ct. 322 (1923). 
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Court decisions on direct review of Patent Office refusals to 
grant patents furnish further examples. The 1944 decision of the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Shortell30 is par-
ticularly noteworthy. The patent sought was to a hacksaw blade 
having teeth on both edges, the teeth on one edge having less set 
than the teeth on the other edge. The prior art included saw 
blades generally with teeth on both edges, together with one prior 
art patent showing planing teeth of one set on one edge of the 
blade and cutting teeth of different set on the other edge. The 
margin of novelty was plainly small, yet the court reversed the 
Patent Office and held that invention was present. 
The Shortell decision rests in part on the showing of commer-
cial success and upon the fact that the best reference was some 
· sixty years old. As to the latter point the court stated, "If this 
improvement was obvious to one skilled in the art, as held by the 
Patent Office tribunals, it seems to us that sixty years would not 
have elapsed before it was made."31 
A second theme of broader importance runs through the 
Shortell opinion. The court specifically noted the "flash of crea-
tive genius" requirement expressed by the Supreme Court in the 
Cuno decision,32 and the related expressions of other courts that 
there was a "new doctrinal trend" toward higher standards of 
invention.33 The court nevertheless-adhered to earlier standards 
of invention, stating: 
"While recognizing, of course, that it is the duty of this 
court to follow the law as declared by the Supreme Court, we 
do not conceive it to be our duty to change our basis of de-
cision merely because some courts assume that there is a 'new 
doctrinal trend' with regard to the standards required for 
invention. 
"In our opinion it is not within the province of the courts 
to establish new standards by which invention is to be deter-
mined. It seems clear to us that the creation of new standards 
for the determination of what constitutes invention would be 
judicial legislation and not judicial interpretation. 
"It follows, from the foregoing, that until Congress shall 
otherwise legislate, or the Supreme Court shall otherwise 
specifically hold, this court will continue to hold that if a 
30 (C.C.P.A. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 292. 
31 Id. at 294. 
32 Cuno Eng. Corp. v. The Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 at 91, 62 S.Ct. 37 
(1941). 
33 Especially Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632. 
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process or thing constitutes patentable subject matter, is new 
and useful, and the process performed or thing produced 
would not be obvious to one skilled in the art, invention 
should be presumed and a patent may properly issue there-
for. "34 
More recently, in Pattinson v. Marzall35 the Patent Office re-
fused to allow a patent application to a method of storing natural 
gas in underground salt cavities. The prior art included instances 
of using underground cavities generally for this purpose. Thus 
the purported invention differed from the prior art only in the 
use of salt cavities as distinguished from other cavities, a difference 
considered by the Patent Office to be within the skill of the calling. 
On bill in equity to review the Patent Office decision the district 
court concluded that the salt cavities had special advantages for 
the purpose, that simplicity and obviousness formed no criteria 
of invention, and that the Patent Office erred in refusing the 
patent application. 
The ammoniated dentrifice litigation is also illuminating. In 
Ex parte Kesel,36 the Patent Office Board of Appeals held that 
claims directed to a dentifrice having "at least about 1 % by weight 
of a nontoxic salt of ammonia" were not allowable because the 
prior art showed the use of ammonium salts as a dentrifice and 
there was nothing to indicate that the particular proportion was 
critical. A claim specifying a range of one percent to seven per-
cent was similarly held not to define invention. Kesel thereupon 
filed bill in equity to have the Patent Office refusal reviewed. 
During the pendency of the bill the patent examiner became satis-
fied that a claim to "not less than 2%" dibasic ammonium phos-
phate was allowable. In a recent decision, the Kesel-patent as 
. thus issued was upheld as directed to invention.37 
To be sure, these examples do not dispose of the apparently 
critical recent Supreme Court decisions. Of these the Cuno case38 
is most well known, especially for the statement of Justice Douglas 
that, ". . . the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal 
the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling. 
If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the 
34 (C.C.P.A. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 292 at 296. 
35 (D.C.D.C. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 787. 
36103 U.S.P.Q. 103 (1952). 
37 The University of Illinois Foundation v. Block Drug Co., (D.C. Ill. 1955) 107 
U.S.P.Q. 159. 
38 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37 (1941). 
"600 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
public domain. "39 As presented to the Supreme Court, however, 
the case involved a contention that, ". . . degree of invention or 
ingenuity is not a test contemplated by the Constitution and the 
patent laws to determine whether or not an invention or discovery 
shall receive protection. . . . Congress could have entailed limita-
tions as to the degree of invention to be rewarded by patents but 
it has never done so."40 
In substance, the Court was being asked to overrule the doc-
trine laid down in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood41 almost a century 
earlier. The statement of Justice Douglas appears to have been 
made more as an emphatic answer to this extreme contention than 
as establishing a new standard of invention. There is some indica-
tion that he himself so regarded it.42 In any event, as the concur-
ring opinion in the Cuno case points out, there was a deviation 
between what was shown in the patent and the structure said to 
be an infringement and the case clearly entailed a rather broad 
patent interpretation making the prior art structures particularly 
relevant. 
The A. and P. case43 and its sequel, the per curiam Crest 
Specialty decision,44 are likewise frequently referred to as recent 
Supreme Court decisions indicating that the Patent Office deviated 
from the proper standards of invention. Yet each case reached 
the Supreme Court after unanimous and concurrent fact findings 
of the lower courts that invention was present, and this alone 
would seem sufficient vindication of the Patent Office actions. 
More importantly, the A. and P. decision, in listing examples of 
cases where the Court had sustained combination patents, men-
tioned two decisions upholding extremely minor changes as "in-
. vention."45 One of these cases contains the classic statement: 
39 Id. at 91. 
40 Brief for Petitioner, No. 6, OcL Term 1941, pp. 42-43. 
4111 How. (52 U.S.) 248 (1850). 
42 In a note to the concurring opinion in Great A. &: P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 at 154, 71 S.Ct. 127 (1950), Justice Douglas lists some 
six earlier cases using the term "genius" to describe patentable invention. The text 
referring to the footnote reads, "through the years the opinions of the Court commonly 
have taken 'inventive genius' as the test." 
43 Great A. &: P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 
127 (1950). 
44 Crest Specialty v. David C. Trager, 341 U.S. 912, 71 S.CL 733 (1951). 
45 Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 14 S.Ct. 295 (1894); Diamond Rubber 
Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 31 S.Ct. 444 (1911). The Keystone case 
related to a patented corn shelling machine. The machine was identical with the prior 
art machine save only that the direction of rotation of a winged shaft was reversed. 
In the prior art machine the shaft turned oppositely to the movement of the com and 
thus tended to throw the com back and thereby contribute to clogging. The reversal 
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" Knowledge after the event is always easy, and problems 
once solved present no difficulties, indeed, may be repre-
sented as never having had any, and expert witnesses may 
be brought forward to show that the new thing which seemed 
to have eluded the search of the world was always ready at 
hand and easy to be seen by a merely skillful attention. But 
the law has other tests of the invention than subtle conjectures 
of what might have been but was not .... "46 
Any attempt completely to reconcile all of these decisions 
would be futile. They do show, however, that the Patent Office 
is hardly as anxious to "spawn" a list of "incredible patents" as 
has been suggested. Rather, the record indicates that the office 
is steering a middle course, not as liberal as some of the decisions 
might justify and more liberal than the statements that can be 
taken from others. Contentions that a particular application 
shows "invention" of the level of the Eibel and Ray-O-Vac cases, 
for example, are not likely to be successful at the Patent Office 
level, at least until supported by a factual showing of the unusual 
commercial circumstances of those cases. On the other hand, the 
office does not rely upon a literal "flash of genius" requirement 
such as is expressed in the Cuno decision, particularly since the 
1952 patent code now expressly negatives that test.47 
File Wrapper Estoppel 
Patent Office examining activity has an aspect somewhat apart 
from the question of invention. When the applicant files the 
application he makes "claims" specifying the scope of the patent 
desired. The Patent Office is charged with the duty of examining 
the application and of issuing the patent only if "it appears that 
the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law."48 In practice 
the examination consists of collecting the closest prior art and, in 
of shaft rotation tended to cause the com to be thrown in the direction of movement 
through the machine and thereby reduced the problem of clogging. The Diamond case 
involved a solid rubber-tired wheel construction wherein the wheel rim had outwardly 
inclined sides. The prior art included like solid rubber-tired wheel constructions where 
the sides of the rim were not inclined and wherein the sides inclined inwardly rather 
than outwardly. Drawings of the respective constructions are reproduced in the opinion, 
at 432 and 438. 
46 Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 at 435, 31 
S.Ct. 444 (1911). ' 
47 " ••• Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention 
was made." 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. See notes 7 and 8 supra. 
48 35 u.s.c. (1952) §131. 
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most instances, of rejecting the claims one or more times as not 
defining invention over that art. To overcome such rejections 
the patent applicant of necessity must argue that the claims are 
allowable and point out wherein invention is defined over the 
specific prior art located. This process of argumentation, and 
particularly the cancellation or amendment of claims, results in 
a Patent Office file which frequently includes a "file wrapper 
estoppel" of importance in fixing the scope of the patent as issued. 
The file wrapper estoppel doctrine is of major importance in 
cases where the patentee must have the benefit of some liberality 
in the construction of patent claims. Such occasions arise fre-
quently because it is often possible to appropriate the principle 
of an invention and at the same time escape the literal language 
of the claims-an opportunity seldom overlooked by an infringer. 
In consequence, the patentee must argue that the infringement is 
the "equivalent" of the invention as claimed. Recognizing this 
practical problem "on proper occasions courts make [the claims] 
cover more than their meaning will bear" to hold as an infringe-
ment a structure which does not respond to the literal claim 
language.49 This is the "doctrine of equivalents." 
The doctrine of equivalents is itself limited by the file wrapper 
estoppel doctrine. Its nature is best illustrated by the Ace Patents 
case.50 There the patent related to a bumper switch of the type 
commonly used in pinball games. The switch consisted of a 
pendulous helical spring which, when struck by the ball rolling 
down the table, is flexed sideways to make contact with a fixed 
contact and thereby actuate the electrical mechanism of the game. 
As filed, the patent claims recited that the fixed contact need only 
be "carried by the table." In this form the claims were rejected 
on prior art patents. In a successful effort to overcome the re-
jection the applicant substituted the more restrictive expression 
that the fixed contact be "embedded in" the table. The subse-
quent patent infringement suit involved two accused structures. 
In one of these the fixed contact was in fact embedded in the table. 
In the other the defendant had made the rather obvious and 
superficial change of providing a separate cover plate to carry the 
fixed contact over an opening in the table so that, while carried 
by the table, the contact was not embedded in it. The patentee 
49 Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 691 
at 692. 
50 Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 62 S.Ct. 513 (1942). 
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argued that the construction with the separate cover plate was 
"equivalent" to embedding the contact in the table and that in 
any event there was a literal evasion of the claim without alteration 
of result or mode of operation. 
The Court held that the patentee could not utilize the doctrine 
of equivalents to hold as an infringement the construction wherein 
the fixed contact was not literally "embedded in" the table. It 
assumed that "the patentee would have been entitled to equival-
ents embracing the accused devices had he originally claimed a 
'conductor means embedded in the table.' "51 However, looking to 
the language of the claims as filed, and especially to the phrase 
"carried by the table," the Court concluded, "By striking that 
phrase from the claim and substituting for it 'embedded in the 
table', the applicant restricted his claims to those combinations in 
which the conductor means, though carried by the table, is also 
embedded in it. By the amendment, he recognized and empha-
sized the difference between the two phrases and proclaimed his 
abandonment of all that is embraced in that difference.''52 The 
Court went on to conclude that from the standpoint of claim 
construction "the difference which [ the applicant] thus disclaimed 
must be regarded as material, and since the amendment operates 
as a disclaimer of that difference it must be strictly construed 
against him.''53 Accordingly, the Court found infringement as 
to the structure with the contact literally embedded in the table 
but not the structure wherein the contact was only "carried by" 
the table. 
In a more recent case54 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit summarized the file wrapper estoppel doctrine in even 
more farreaching terms to hold that: ". . . a patentee who has 
changed the form of his claim during its prosecution disclaims the 
scope of the claim in its earlier form, and the change effected by 
the amendment must be construed against the patentee. He is 
not permitted thereafter to recapture what he has disclaimed or 
assert the claim against any equivalents that would respond to the 
claim in its earlier form but which do not respond expressly to 
the claim as issued.'' 
The file wrapper estoppel doctrine finds expression in com-
51 Id. at 136. 
52Ibid. 
53 Id. at 137. 
54 Dixie Cup Co. v. Paper Container Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 645 at 648. 
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paratively early patent decisions.55 It finds its roots in the rules 
governing the construction of documents generally. Thus an 
analogy has been drawn to the construction of contracts.56 Simi-
larly, legislation has been construed in the light of what was pro-
posed and not passed.57 Additional analogy may be found in 
court insistence that a patentee follow a consistent interpretation 
of a patent in successive patent infringement proceedings.58 
The file wrapper ·estoppel doctrine is of particular interest 
because of the absolute finality it imparts to Patent Office rulings. 
The courts have consistently refused to go behind the Patent Office 
action upon which the estoppel is based. The plausible, and 
sometimes sound, argument that the rejection should not have 
been made in the first place has been discarded. As stated in the 
Ace Patents case, "as the question is one of construction of the 
claim, it is immaterial whether the examiner was right qr wrong 
in rejecting the claim as filed."59 In substance the courts have 
insisted that the patentee make his case before the Patent Office 
or forever be silent. 
To be sure, the file wrapper estoppel doctrine goes to the scope 
of the patent-not to its validity. It is nonetheless of importance 
in the practical operation of the patent system. The scope of a 
patent determines its influence upon competitive enterprise as 
significantly as the fact of the patent. Thus in the Ace Patents 
case the Court drew a sharp line between the machines with con-
dµctors "embedded in" the table-which were held to infringe-
and the competitively equivalent machines with conductors only 
"carried by" the table-which were held not to infringe. So far 
as conductor means were "carried by" the table are concerned 
there might just as well have been no patent at all. There is thus 
good reason to believe that through the file wrapper estoppel 
doctrine the Patent Office examining activity has served a useful 
purpose in defining strictly the scope of the grant. 
55 E.g., Sargent v. Hall Safe and Lock Co., 114 U.S. 63, 5 S.Ct. 1021 (1885); Hubbell 
v. United States, 179 U.S. 77 at 83, 21 S.Ct. 24 (1900); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 
6 S.Ct. 493 (1886). 
56 E.g., Knick v. Bowes "Seal Fast" Corp., (8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 442; Power v. 
Mola Washing Machine Co., (8th Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 1009; Magic Light Co. v. Economy 
Gas-Lamp Co., (7th Cir. 1899) 97 F. 87. 
<57 E.g., Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct. 
589 (1943); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951). 
58 Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Graver Tank &: Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1948) 196 
F. (2d) 103, cert. den. 343 U.S. 967, 72 S.Ct. 1059 (1952), 344 U.S. 849, 73 S.Ct. 6 (1952). 
59 315 U.S. 126 at 137, 62 S.Ct. 513 (1942). 
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The file wrapper estoppel doctrine, like all legal principles, 
has its own limitations. One is that its full application requires 
that the patent examiner locate the best prior art. Secondly, there 
is a line of decisions, principally in the Second Circuit, holding 
in effect that the doctrine does not apply unless claims are can-
celled or formally amended.60 Also one can point to decisions 
where the courts, apparently impressed with the significance of the 
invention, have seemingly refused to apply the doctrine.61 
Finally, it should be noted that the patent applicant can avoid 
a file wrapper estoppel. If he knows the prior art and is modest 
in his claims as filed, he may never be forced to make the limiting 
arg1:1ments and claim amendments that give rise to the estoppel.62 
Even as thus limited, however, the doctrine is a factor in a sub-
stantial proportion of the patent cases and should not be over-
looked in evaluating the work of the Patent Office. 
It cannot be denied that the statistical record-early and late-
indicates that an issued patent is one thing and a valid patent 
another. The tendency to equate this record with Patent Office 
error is, it is submitted, a dubious generalization. Rather, the 
more complete prior art available in an infringement suit, the 
intervening period of commercial experience with the patented 
product or process, the differences between the patent interpreta-
tion urged before a court and that in the Patent Office, and other 
factors all combine to make court scrutiny of a patent something 
far different from that possible in the Patent Office. 
It follows that mere strictness in the examining function is not 
likely to dissipate the uncertainties. To be sure, the Patent Office 
could follow a severe rule that would preclude patent issuance in 
the presence of any lingering doubt that a court would uphold 
the patent. But few patents would issue under such a rule and 
the office would doubtless face an unreasonable number of re-
versals by the courts on direct review. More importantly, such a 
rule would cut off many patents destined to be upheld in court, 
and surely the patent law contemplates the issuance of such 
patents. It would seem that the only practical approach is an 
intermediate one along the lines of that now being followed. 
60 E.g., Spalding & Bros. v. John Wanamaker, (2d Cir. 1919) 256 F. 530; Keith v. 
Chas. E. Hires Co., (2d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 46. 
61 E.g., Hunt v. Armour & Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 722. 
62 It has been suggested that this occurred in Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products, 
339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950). See dissenting opinion of Justice Black at 616. 
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There is opportunity for improvement in a different direction. 
Current Patent Office prior art files include millions of items. The 
process of classification and search is staggering. The office is 
engaged in a losing task of ~eeping current with the items being 
added to its files. There is reason to believe that automatic tech-
niques may permit a complete and rapid collection of all the prior 
art items without laborious searching. Interim measures also offer 
great promise in this direction, provided the necessary financial 
support is made available.63 With more complete collection of 
the prior art, the resultant Patent Office proceedings are likely in 
a greater proportion of cases to lead to a file wrapper record of a 
type precluding the elastic patent interpretations that are one 
cause of difficulty. 
At best, however, we shall continue to experience substantial 
patent mortality in the courts. In like measure the outcome of 
patent controversies will remain unpredictable. But this condition 
is not unique, as practitioners in the field of personal injury and 
antitrust law can attest. Rather, this uncertainty is the price that 
must be paid for the test based on the fictitious ordinary man 
skilled in the art, which to the present date appears to be the only 
reasonably adequate measure of what should be rewarded by 
patent grant and what should not. 
63 For a review of the current problems of the Patent Office, see 37 J.P.O.S. 769 
(1955). The problem of classification and search is discussed at p. 801 et seq. 
